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STATE REGULATION OF
CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS
Neal Devins*
How can nonpublic education be both responsible andfree? Responsible
to serve thepublic interest;freeto experiment anddisagree. Without regulation, some schools may victimize patrons and endanger the general
welfare. With regulation, dissent isjeopardized Where should the balance be struck?'

Christian day schools2 are the fastest growing segment of private
education. This growth has been accompanied by an unprecedented
amount of litigation between fundamentalist educators and the state,
and an unprecedented amount of negotiation and legislative proposals.4 The fundamentalists contend, as a matter of religious conviction,
that the state's role in the regulation of fundamentalist schools is limited to ensuring that every school provides its students with a basic core
curriculum and that the schools satisfy reasonable fire, health, and
safety standards.5 Government officials, perceiving their role as en-

compassing much more, have often enacted a variety of laws and regulations which govern, among other things, teacher qualifications,
curriculum, and textbooks. 6 Government officials allege that the existing structure of laws and regulations is a necessary and unobtrusive
means to ensuring that every child in the state receives an adequate
education. 7
The conffict between the fundamentalists and the state has been
*
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I.

PUBLIC CONTROLS FOR NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS 2 (D. Erikson ed. 1969).

2.

When used throughout this Article, the terms Christian day schools, Christian schools, and
fundamentalist schools are used synonymously.

3.

See THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHRISTIAN SCHOOL EDUCATION 1 (P. Kienel ed. 1977) [hereinafter

cited as KIENEL]. Based on the best available data, between eight and ten thousand of these
schools have been established since the mid-1960's, with a current enrollment of approximately one million students. Carper, The Christian Day School Movement, 1960-1982, 17

4.
5.

EDUC. F. 135 (1983).
This article shall be limited to legal controversies between the fundamentalist educators and
the state. The entire controversy, however, is much broader. See Devins, Fundamentalist
Schools vs. the Regulators, Wall St. J. Apr. 14, 1983, at 26, col. 3.
See Ball, Religious Liberty.- New Issues and Past Decisions in A BLUEPRINT FOR JUDICIAL
REFORM,

6.
7.

327-49 (P. McGuigan & R. Rader eds. 1981).

See id
See Brown, Minimum Standardsare Needed, CHURCH & STATE, May, 1980, at 8. Underly-

ing this belief is the presumption that a substantial enough number of private sectarian
schools will fail in their education mission to justify state-imposed burdens on pluralism,
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heightened by the varying successes and failures of each group before
state boards of education, 8 in the halls of the state legislature,9 and
before the courts.1" Since Christian educators and state officials can

point to "victories for their side" in other states, both groups have
strengthened their resolve to remain fixed in their position. Yet varying
policy determinations on the part of state rulemakers and state
lawmakers do not suggest that neither side is right or wrong or that no
sensible policy alternative exists. Inconsistent judicial holdings certainly do not suggest that there is not an appropriate standard of review

in this type of litigation.
Freedom of choice lies at the heart of American democracy.11 Yet
some individuals contend that in the field of education, government
regulations should promote a state-selected system of values. A democracy should encourage all of its citizens to develop and refine their
personal interests so that they can effectively participate in the political

process. A pluralistic society, like ours, certainly should not attempt to
breed conformity through its educational system. 2
religious liberty, and parental rights. The evidence, however, is to the contrary. See infra
note 17.
8.
In Colorado, for example, fundamentalists were successful in their lobbying efforts to prevent the State Board of Education from adopting minimum standards for private schools.
See Craby, Educators Expect Fight Over Minimum Private-SchoolStandards, Denver Post,
Aug. 11, 1981, and Carper, The Whisner Decision: .4 Case Study in State Regulation of Christian Day Schools, 24 J. CHURCH & STATE 281, 301 n.67. In Maine, however, fundamentalists were unable to convince state officials to modify some of the regulations which governed
their schools. Conversation with Ralph Yarnell, Maine Association of Christian Schools.
9.
In Pennsylvania, the Keystone Christian Education Association was unable to push through
a measure which would have deregulated many aspects of private religious schooling. Conversation with Henry S. Aschbrenner, Deputy Executive Director, Pennsylvania Catholic
Conference. Fundamentalists were also unsuccessful to have legislation adopted in Maine
and Nebraska. See O'Quinn, ChristianSchools to Continue to Fight State, Central Maine
Morning Sentinel, Aug. 10, 1981; Herman, Church School dispute quite now but-,
Lincoln
(Neb.) Journal, June 30, 1982. Fundamentalists in North Carolina and Alabama, however,
were successful in having legislation adopted which effectively deregulated private religious
education. 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 505 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 115C, art. 39
(Cum. Supp. 1981) (replacing N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 115, art. 32 (1978)); Act of Apr. 6, 1982,
No. 218, 1982 Ala. Acts -(amending ALA. CODE §§ 16-28-1, -3, -7, -8, -15, -23; 16-40-1; 161-11; 16-4-16).
10. See infra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
11. As James Madison stated in the FEDERAIIST PAPERS, "ambition must counter ambition.
since justice is the aim of government." THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison). Similarly,
Justice Jackson contended in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943),
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.
319 U.S. at 639. John Stuart Mill expressed similar views in his essay On Liberty:
The worth of a State, in the long run is the worth of the individuals composing it;...
A state which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its
hands even for beneficial purposes-will find that with small men no great thing can
really be accomplished; and that the perfection of machinery to which it has sacrificed
everything, will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order
that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish.
(Crofts Classic ed.) 117-118.
12. Reflective of this view, Robert Kamenshine writes,
The use of public schools to instill political values poses a serious threat to the marketplace of ideas and the integrity of the democratic process. Children are particu-
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If we truly cherish religious liberty, we should embody this freedom

in our laws and judicial standards. If Christian educators can demonstrate that their students learn as much as their public school counter-

parts, the state should limit its regulatory role to core curriculum
requirements and school safety."3 If state laws and regulations infringe
on a sincere religious belief, the courts should require that the state
introduce "clear and convincing proof' that its regulatory scheme is the

least intrusive means available to obtain some compelling state interest.

4

The dual focus of this article is an analysis of the positions and

policy arguments made by state regulators and Christian educators and
on the need for the courts to adopt a standard of review requiring state

regulators to prove by clear and convincing proof their compelling state
interest in the regulation of fundamentalist schools.
THE INTERESTS OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATORS
Christian schools come in all shapes and sizes. Some are one-room

schoolhouses which make use of self-paced curriculum packets; others
are structured in much the same manner as public schools. Some are
either affiliated with or part of a church or are independent. Common
to all schools, however, is a strict adherence to an established interpre-

tation of fundamentalist religious and social values.' 5

larly susceptible to political indoctrination. As a consequence, the implementation of
a political establishment prohibition (against state-selected ideologies) in this setting
is crucial.
Kamenshine, The FirstAmendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CoLo. L.

Rv.1104, 1134.
Also supportive of this view, Chester Finn has commented,
The United States is a heterogeneous society in which people-individually, and in
groups and communities-hold varied and sometimes quite divergent ideas about the
desirable character and content of formal education. These differ among such dimensions as curriculum, pedagogical style, discipline, morality, values, religious content,
and academic standards. Public policy should foster educational pluralism and diversity that are responsive to those differences within the society rather than seeking to
impose a uniform or homogeneous definition of schooling.
Finn, Public Support for Private Education II, AM. EDUC., June 1980, at 9. Professors
Kamenshine and Finn thus emphasize the need to produce graduates capable of independently and critically assessing American society. See Katz, he Present Moment in EducationalRe/orm, 41 HARV. EDUC. REv.342, 356 (1971).
13. See Devims, supra note 4.
14. See DevinsA FundamentalistRight to Education?,NAT'L L.J., Feb. 21, 1983; Boothby, Government Entanglement with Religion: What Degree of Proof is Required, 7 PEPI'PERDINE L.

15.

REV. 613 (1980).
Peter Skerry, who conducted a study of Christian schools in North Carolina, noted:
The day begins with prayer, and pledges to both the American and the blue-andwhite Christian flag. Each class begins with prayer, and meals with grace...
[A]lthough Bible study is only one part of the curriculum, all subjects are taught from
a Christian perspective ...One of the most distinctive features of these schools is the
strict discipline code... Insubordination or undisciplined behavior of any sort is not
tolerated ... Each school also has a detailed dress code ... [These rules are merely
the reflection of everyone's values, teachers and parents alike. Willingness to abide by
them is the primary admission criteria ...As a result the interaction between teachers and students is not marked by fear and intimidation but by mutual respect and
friendliness.
Skerry, Christian Schools Versus the IRS, PuB. INTEREST, Fall, 1980, at 23-24.
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The curriculum method utilized by Christian educators often varies
considerably from school to school. The most popular curriculum form
is the Advanced Christian Education Program (ACE). "The ACE
method of instruction is a self-study program whereby students work at
their own speed and progress through a series of learning packets on
varying subjects, referred to as 'paces.' The ACE program is Bibleoriented in that passages from scripture are contained within the teaching materials.. .. [T]he ACE curriculum is currently being used in
approximately 3,000 church schools throughout the United States. An
additional 500 to 1,000 new schools are expected to utilize the curriculum when their doors open in [the next school year]."' 6 Regardless of
the curriculum form used, students in Christian schools generally do at
least as well on nationally
recognized achievement tests as their public
17
school counterparts.
Christian school teachers are hired on the basis of religious conviction, not academic qualifications.1 8 Christian school teachers also receive extremely modest pay.' 9 Thus it should come as no surprise that
Christian school teachers feel they are pursuing a religious mission.2 0
Proponents of the rights of Christian educators often argue that teacher
certification laws are unfair because it might be extremely difficult to
find an individual who satisfies both the school's religious criteria and
state's academic standards.2 ' Yet, at present, approximately seventy
percent of Christian school teachers have graduated from a four-year
college.2 2
23
Parents are actively involved in the running of Christian schools.
In Missouri, for example, sixty-three percent of the families provide
volunteer service to the Christian school.2 4 This active parental role is
often pointed to by Christian school advocates as evidence that these
16.
17.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 886 (N.D. 1980).
If anything, it appears that private sectarian schools are doing a better job with their students
than the public schools. See Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 55456 (1979) (Testimony of Dr. Paul Kienel, Executive Director of the Association of Christian
Schools International); Murrenk What Things are Caesar's?, CHURCH & STATE, May 1980, at
6; BARTON & J. WHITEHEAD, SCHOOLS ON FIRE 49 (1980).
In State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976), "the prosecutor in the
trial of the Whisner case objected to the introduction of the Stanford Achievement Test
scores on the Tabernacle Christian students as 'irrelevant and immaterial.' Apparently, the
state took the position that compliance with the minimum standards was indispensable to an
adequate education." Rice, Conscientious Objection to PublicEducation: The Grievance and
the Remedies, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 847, 886 (1978).
See Skerry, supra note 15, at 25-26; and Ball supra note 5, at 336-338.
See Skerry, supra note 15, at 25 and D. HAM, REASONS WHY PARENTS ENROLL THEIR CHILDREN IN FUNDAMENTALIST CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri
at Columbia, 1982).
See supra note 18.
See Ball, supra note 5, at 336.
See D. HAM, supra note 19, at abstract.
See Skerry, supra note 15, at 26.
See D. HAM, supra note 19, at abstract.
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schools will be self-regulating without unnecessary and intrusive state
interference. Attorney William Ball, for example, has commented that
[p]arents are not long going to invest money in schools which are
worthless. Parents who care enough about their children to enroll
them in private schools are, by and large, parents who are25keenly interested in their children and willing to sacrifice for them.
The Christian school movement is a national phenomenon of fairly
recent origin. Although some schools were formed more than fifty
years ago, the average age of the schools is less than six years.2 6 Despite its recent growth, Christian schools still adhere to a well-defined
educational philosophy. Consequently, state lawmakers and bureaucrats have an established factual base on which to make legislative and
rulemaking determinations. Lawmakers' actions, however, are not
predictable.
Perspectives of Christian Educators
The growth of Christian schools can be explained by two interrelated phenomena. First, fundamentalists are dissatisfied with the academic and social environments of public schools.2 7 Second,
fundamentalists believe that public schools have become "secularized"
so that religious values no longer have a place in public education.28
Fundamentalists are dissatisfied with the academic and social environments of the public schools for several reasons. The most significant reason is the perceived breakdown of the nuclear family. This is
evidenced by the increased willingness of parents "to have the state
take over formation of their children."2 9 Fundamentalists find this unacceptable for two reasons. First, the fundamentalists believe that parents shape the future through the upbringing of their children.3 0
Second, fundamentalists allege that the state, if left to its own devices,
will create a monolithic educational structure which stamps out "the
needed diversity for a truly free society."'"
Fundamentalists are also fearful of the "moral breakdown"' in our
public schools associated with lack of discipline, sexual permissiveness,
and drug and alcohol abuse.3 2 This perceived breakdown is viewed as
antithetical to the learning of both ethical and academic lessons. The
moral corruption and intellectual decay among today's youth is attrib25. Ball, supra note 5, at 12.
26. See D. HAM, supra note 19, at 37-38.
27. See Devins, supra note 4; and Carper, supra note 3, at 281-282.
28. See Devins, supra note 4; J. WHITEHEAD, THE NEw TYRANNY 18 (1982), Whitehead & CoIan, The Establishmentofthe Religion of SecularHumanism andits FirstAmendment Implication, 10 TEXAS TECH L. REv. 1 (1978); and Rice, supra note 17. This notion--that public
schools inculcate their students with secular values-was recently acknowledged in [Ala-

bama school Government of Christian Schools prayer case].
29. W. BALL, LITIGATION IN EDUCATION: IN DEFENSE OF FREEDOM 14 (1977).
30. See J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 28, at 20-22.
31. J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 28, at 3. See also Ball, supra note 5.
32. See Carper supra note 3, at 281-282; and D. HAM, supra note 19.
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uted to a number of factors, including television, lack of parental su33
pervision, and lower expectations of children in the public schools.
Interestingly, these criticisms of public schools bear a striking resemblance to a number of studies undertaken
to explain the decline of col34
lege entrance examination scores.
These criticisms reflect a basic philosophical difference between
Christian educators and the public school establishment. "Like the
seventeenth-century Puritans, [fundamentalists] believe in the 'innate
depravity of man.' Because they believe that the corrupt nature of humanity can be changed only through a supernatural infusion of Divine
grace, religious 'conversion' becomes the basis of all education. Furthermore, since human nature is utterly depraved, children require
strict supervision and authoritarian guidance. ' 35 In sharp contrast,
fundamentalists see public education as operating under the premise
that human nature is basically good, 36 which results in less supervision
than necessary to keep students on the course of righteousness and

dignity.
Finally, fundamentalists accuse the public school establishment of
inculcating their students with a system of values known as "secular
humanism. '37 Humanism signifies "the idea that men and women can
begin from themselves without reference to the Bible, and by reasoning
outward, derive the standards to judge all matters."3 8 Fundamentalists
object to the teaching of "secular humanism" for three reasons. First,
they believe that God, as reflected in the Bible, is the proper source of
all values.3 9 Second, they claim that the humanistic value system is in a
constant state of flux and thus is incapable of serving as the basis for
consistent moral judgment.4" Third, they feel that public school students are being denied access to important lessons whose source is the
Bible.41 This denial is a result of several Supreme Court decisions
which prohibited the teaching of creationism, 42 organized prayer,4 3 Bible readings,' and the posting of the Ten Commandments in the public schools.4 5 Exacerbating this problem is the inclusion of courses in
the public school curriculum, such as sex education and the evolution
33. Id
34. See, e.g., On FurtherExamination: Report of the Advisory Panelon the Scholastic Aptitude
Test Decline, College Entrance Examination Board (1977).
35. Nordin & Turner, More than SegregationAcademies: The GrowingProtestantFundamentalist
Schools, 61 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 391, 392-93 (February, 1980).
36. See id at 393.
37. See supra note 28.
38. J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 28 at 38.
39. See generally id; and KIENEL supra note 3.
40. See J.WHITEHEAD, supra note 28 at 41-42, where American humanism is referred to as "a
system of arbitrary absolutes, philosophical relativism that changes with opinion but that
demands absolute submission to its arbitrary will of the moment."
41. D. HAM, supra note 19, at 75.
42. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
43. Engel v Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
44. Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
45. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
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46
of man, which the fundamentalists find morally objectionable.
All of these criticisms express disapproval of our society for fostering this educational enterprise. As Professor James Carper noted, "[t]o
many evangelicals the public school exemplifies the trend they deplore

in the changing American social order, such as uncertainty concerning
sources of authority, dissolution of standards, waning of the Judeo-

Christian value system, loosening of custom and constraint, scientism,

and government social engineering. '47 Moreover, "[a] local fundamentalists church. . . is both homogenous and highly stable. It is the only
organization which its members control at a time they feel [that] gov-

ernment institutions are out of control. It is often the only structure
they trust and certainly the one in which they feel most comfortable,
since
much of their social as well as their spiritual life revolves around
48
it."

Many of the fundamentalists' criticisms of public education are
based on their belief that the public school environment inculcates a set
of values at odds with the types of moral lessons that they want to see
their children learn. But the fundamentalists also seek to advance a

particular set of religious values through their schools, rather than
merely removing their children from a "hostile" public school environ-

ment. Christian schools, therefore, base their actions on two constitutionally protected rights: the general right of parents to direct the

upbringing of their children, 49 and the religious liberty interest of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children.

0

Christian educators believe that private religious schools are man-

dated by God.5 ' This belief on the part of the fundamentalists, that

education is inherently religious, mandates noncompliance with state
licensing procedures which grant broad authority to state boards of ed46. See D. HAM,supra note 19, at abstract.
47. Carper,supra note 8, at 281-82. Reflective of these considerations, the reasons for founding a
Christian school are, in order of importance: 1) a desire for students to receive moral and
religious instruction; 2) a desire to have students taught by Christian teachers; 3) a belief that
public schools are academically inferior, 4) opposition to specific courses taught in public
schools; and 5) a belief that there are discipline problems in the public schools. See D. HAM,
supra note 19, at abstract. It should be noted that these schools are not formed in order to
avoid school desegregation orders. See D. HAM, supra note 19; Nordin & Turner, supra note
35; and Skerrysupra note 15 at 28-31.
48. Skerry, supra note 15, at 23 (quoting from The Schools That FearBuilt).
49. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
50. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
51. This mandate has been staled:
First, the Bible teaches that children belong to the Lord (Ezekiel 18:4, Psalms 50:12)
and that the Lord has given children to parents as a heritage (Psalms 127:3). Parents,
as God's stewards, are commanded to teach their children in their belief-"in the
nature and admonition of the Lord" (Deuteronomy 6:6, Ephesians 6:4). Finally, all
people instructed to obey God's commands (Proverbs22:6). Thus, God while delegating specific responsibilities to civil government (Romans 13:1-7; I Timothy 2:14; IPeter 2:13-17), has clearly staked out education as religious and doctrinal in content and
wholly within the province of the local church.
SMITH, FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON STATE REGULATIONS OF RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS

[Independent Writing Project: 1-11-80]. See also COOLEY, THE CHRISTIAN EDUCATION
MANDATE (Berean Baptist Christian Academy).
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ucation to promulgate "equivalent educational standards" for nonpublic schools." For the fundamentalists, this authority in effect makes the
state lord over their schools.
Fundamentalists also refuse, as a matter of religious conviction, to
abide by far-reaching state regulations.5 3 This refusal is based on the
belief that the state education bureaucracy is hostile to the central religious mission of Christian schools. 5 4 In support of this contention, fundamentalist educators allege that the educational bureaucracy has been
unduly influenced by anti-Christian thinkers. 5 Fundamentalists believe that the more the state seeks to make its private religious schools
more like public schools through regulations, the less likely it is for

Christian schools to fulfill their religious mission.
Another reason Christian educators refuse to follow many state regulations is because they view their schools as God's property.5 6 For
them, to concede that the state has the ultimate authority to regulate
their schools would breach the New Testament command to "render,
therefore, to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things
that are God's."57 Christian educators claim that the Christian school,
as an inherently religious institution, is properly within God's province.
Fundamentalists acknowledge, however, that some limited state regulation is appropriate to ensure that students learn basic subject areas in a
healthy environment.5 8 The fundamentalists are more concerned with
52. See supra note 31; Devins, FundamentalistSchool andthe Law, The Christian Science Moni-

tor, Sept. 22, 1982, at 23; Smith, supra note 51, at 2-3; and Ball supra note 29.
53. See Ball, supra note 29; Ball, supra note 5; and Devins, supra note 52.
54. See J. WHITEHEAD supra note 28, at 9-14.

55. For example, the influential educational philosopher John Dewey contended in A CoMMoN
FAITH: "I cannot understand how any realization of the democratic ideal as a vital moral
and spiritual ideal in human affairs is possible without surrender of the basic division to
which supernatural Christianity is committed." [quoted from J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 28,
at 14].
56. See Smith, supra note 51; and Devins, supra note 52.
57. Matthew 22:21.

58. See W.

BALL,

supra note 29; W.

BALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF CHRISTIAN

SCHOOLS, (198 1); and Ball, Law andthe EducationalMission of Christianity, Theology, News

and Notes, (Dec. 1980), at 9. It should be noted that some fundamentalists are strict separationalists and thus refuse to acknowledge that the state has some legitimate regulatory authority. See The Police Lock a Baptist Church, Christianity Today, Nov. 12, 1982. These

"separationalists" or "religious anarchists" refuse to raise the defense of excessive government involvement in Christian School lawsuits, claiming that to argue that excessive entanglement is impermissible is to concede that some government intervention is permissible.
See Minnery, Does David GibbsPracticeLaw as well as the PreachersChurch-State Separa-

tion?, Christianity Today, April 10, 1981, at 48. This separationist tact has been criticized for
both its failure to recognize that some government regulations are appropriate and its weakness as a legal argument. Id William Bentley Ball offered the following criticism of the
"separationists" in a recent speech:
While we may speak of governmental inadvertence against religious liberty, we must
also take note of the mentality which holds that government is an alien body in our
midst. It is "they" inevitably pitted against "us". . . [Yet] "the government," in the
American System is ourselves, "We the people ... (G)overnment Agents frequently
forget this, but let religious people not fail to remember it.
Ball, Government as Big Brotherto Religious Bodies, reprinted in, GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS,

at 23-24 (D. Kelly ed. 1982).
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the possibility that the state extend its reach and end the parents' con-

trol of their child's moral, spiritual, and educational upbringing.
Fundamentalist educators often challenge expansive state regulations governing their schools in court.5 9 They usually argue that the
enforcement of such laws and regulations would deprive them "of their
liberty to freely carry out their religious mission in the form of Chris-

tian education and chill, if not destroy, the evangelical ministry of the
pastor in the religious mission of the schools in their charge."'6 There
is no reason to suspect that this claim is not sincere.6 1
THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE

Education is one of a state's most compelling responsibilities. The
state's interest in education was noted by the great educational reformer, Horace Mann, who said, "the true business of the schoolroom
connects itself, and becomes identical, with the great interest of soci-

ety."' 62 Economist Milton Friedman claims that "a stable and demo-

cratic society is impossible without a minimum degree of literacy and

knowledge on the part of most citizens and without widespread acceptance of some common set of values.

Education can contribute to

both."'63 Education enables an individual to function as a member of
society and to contribute positively to their community. In other

words, education is: (1) necessary to the individual in that it prepares
him for community life and (2) necessary to our society since it is a
participatory democracy.
Supreme Court decisions on education have evidenced a judicial

cognizance of the fundamental role that education plays in furthering
59.
60.

61.

See infra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
Bangor Baptist Church v. State, 549 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Me. 1982). (State's motion for summary judgment in Christian School lawsuit denied). Another claim typically made by fundamentalists is that:
[Tihe public schools of today are overrun with an increase in crime, drug and alcohol
addiction, teacher assaults, vandalism, and disrespect for authority and property. Additionally, secular humanism is the basic philosophy of the public education system
...[It is] further maintain[ed] that, because their philosophy is Christian and that of
the State Department of Education is not, the latter is not capable of judging the

philosophy of [Christian] school[s]. Finally, because the state school laws require inspection of the school by the county superintendent, [Christian schools] cannot submit
to control because the State has no right to inspect God's property."
State ex rel. Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 806, 301 N.W. 2d 571, 579
(1981).
No court in a state regulation of Christian school lawsuit has held that the school's failure to
comport with state regulations was not religiously motivated. In State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d
883 (N.D. 1980), however, the North Dakota Supreme Court did hold that the religious
school failed to demonstrate that a teacher certification regulation impacted on sincere religious belief. 294 N.W.2d at 894. Also, both the Fifth and Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
have held that sincere religious belief was not at issue in lawsuits involving Christian school
compliance with section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act. Brown v. Dade Christian Schools,
Inc., 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977) and Fiedler v. Marunsco Christian School, 631 F.2d 1144
(4th Cir. 1980). See infra notes 109 to 120 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
cases.

62. Education in a Democracy, ANNALS OF AMERICA 365.
63. M. FRiEDMAN, CAPrrAmSM AND DEMOCRACY 86 (1962).
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the interests of the individual and of the nation. The particular importance of education to a democratic society and to its citizenry was given
classic expression in Brown v. Board of Education:64
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of the state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. . . in these days, it
is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected
to succeed in life
65
if he is denied the opportunity to an education.
Although it has acknowledged education's fundamental role in American society, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the notion that
education should be viewed as a fundamental interest.6 6 The states,
therefore, have broad descretion in establishing rules and regulations
which govern both public and private schools. Not surprisingly, there
are great variations in the sorts of educational philosophies and
con67
comitant regulations which govern America's private schools.
1

64. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
65. Id at 493. Similarly, Justice Frankfurter, in his concurrence in McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), called the public schools
the most powerful agency for promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic
people... The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most
persuasive means for promoting our common density. 333 U.S. at 216.
In Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), Justice Brennan's concurrence
followed this line of thought when he noted:
Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civil institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government. . .It is implicit in the history and character of American public education that the public school serve a uniquely public
function.
374 U.S. at 230, 241-42.
66. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See also Goldstein, InterdistrictInequalitiesin School Financing: A CriticalAnalysisof Serrano v. Priestand
its Progency, 120 PA. L. REV. 504 (1972). But see Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational
PortunityA Workable ConstitutionalTestfor State FinancialStructures, 57 CALIF. L. REV.
5(1969) and Serrano v. Priest II, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929, cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
67. It is important to note the following:
I. Diane Doerge Wilson reports that in a 1980 study Charles O'Malley, now head of the
division of private education for the U.S. Department of Education, found that among the
fifty states: (1) there is no consensus about the definition of a nonpublic school; (2) only five
states have mandatory accreditation for nonpublic schools; (3) twenty-eight states have voluntary accreditation programs; (4) thirty-two states have voluntary or mandatory approval
programs; and (5) six states have private school advisory committees. WILSON, PUBLIC POLICY AND NON-PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A GENERAL OVERVIEW

23 (1981);

II. In 1979, the National Association of Independent Schools, in a survey of state independent school regulations found that: (1) twenty-two states have specific course requirements that apply to nonpublic schools; (2) eighteen states have requirements about the
number of instructional hours students must receive that apply to nonpublic schools;
(3) three states require that students take a state regents examination; (4) sixteen states require that nonpublic schools adhere to all state standards that apply to public schools;
(5) thirty states require some type of reporting of student curriculum or teacher information
from nonpublic schools; (6) six states require mandatory competency evaluations of nonpublic school students, and similar legislation is pending in seven more states;
III. Patricia Lines noted in her 1982 report, Private EducationAlternatives andState Reulations, (Education Commission of the States): "Acceptable ways of meeting the schooling
requirement vary widely among states. Some states require certification of teachers and
schools, some only approval and some only minimal evidence that schooling takes place.
Some states. . . give state and local officials wide discretionary authority to excuse a child
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The authority of the state to promulgate regulations which govern

private sectarian schools is subject to a reasonableness standard. In
Runyon v. McCrary,6" the Supreme Court noted:
[Wlhile parents have a constitutional right to send their children to
private schools and. . to select private schools that offer specialized
instruction, they have no constitutional right to provide their children
with private
school education unfettered by reasonable government
69
regulation.

The Court also noted in Gillette v. UnitedStates70 that "neutral prohib-

itory or regulatory laws having secular aims may impose certain 'incidental burdens' on free exercise when the burden on First Amendment
values is. . .justifiable in the terms of the Government's valid aims."7 1
Although the determination of whether a regulation is reasonable ultimately rests with the judiciary, state legislators have wide discretion in

formulating regulations to govern private schools.
State legislators have enacted, to varying degrees, regulations which
require private sectarian schools to satisfy minimum standards in the
following areas: (1) fire, health, and safety;72 (2) curriculum;73 (3) text76
75
book selection;7 4 (4) instructional time; (5) teacher certification;
from the compulsory attendance requirement. . . . Some states have consciously deregulated their private schools. . . [Some states have] consciously limited the extent to which

the state board can regulate private schools .... Laws in about half the state permit instruction at home by a parent." Id at 3-5;
IV. James Carper reported: "Bills which would to some degree free religious schools
from state control have been introduced during the 1981 and 1982 legislative sessions in
Vermont, Alabama, Nebraska, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. In Illinois,
the House of Representatives sustained Governor James Thompson's veto of a bill which
would have exempted religious schools from state licensing. . . In Iowa, a suit filed against a
church-affiliated school was settled out of court in January 1982." Carper, supra note 8, at
301 n.67. See generally KINDER, THE REGULATION AND ACCREDITATION OF NON-PUBLIC
SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES, (Ph.D. dissertation, University at Missouri at Columbia,
1982).
68. 427 U.S. 160 (1978).
69. Id at 178. See also authorities cited in Note, The State and SectarianEducation: Regulation
to Deregulation, 1980 DUKE L.J. 801, 811-812 note 59.
70. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).

71. Id at 462.
72. This sort of regulation was unsuccessfully challenged by fundamentalists in North Dakota.
State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (1980). Fundamentalists, however, do not generally challenge this sort of regulation. See supra note 58.
73. Fundamentalists prevailed in their challenge to this type of regulation in Ohio and Kentucky. State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St.2d 181, 351 N.E. 2d 750 (1976); Kentucky State Board v.
Rudasill, 589 S.W. 2d 877 (Ky. 1979). The state prevailed in North Dakota, North Carolina,
and Nebraska. State v. Shaver, 294 N.W. 2d 883 (N.D. 1980); State v. Columbus Christian
Academy No. 78 (Wake County, N.C., Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 1978), vacatedas moot anddismissed (N.C. May 4, 1979); State ex rel. Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 301
N.W. 2d 571 (1981). Cases are now pending in Maine, Michigan, Iowa, Nebraska, and Massachusetts. Bangor Baptist Church v. State, 549 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Me. 1982) (summary
judgment granted); Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. State (Ingham County, Mich., Cir. Ct.,
Dec. 29, 1982) (appeal pending); Pruessner v. Benton and State Board of Public Education
(Floyd County, Iowa, Dist. Ct. No. 23190); State v. Bible Baptist Church (Lincoln, County,
Neb., Dist. Ct. No. 359); Attorney General v. Grace Bible Church & Christian School (Suffolk, Mass., Super. Ct., Civ. No. 54209) (also known as Bailey I1).
74.

Fundamentalists successfully challenged textbook selection provisions in North Carolina
(Columbus Christian Academy, supra note 73) and Kentucky (Rudasill,supra note 73).
75. Fundamentalists have generally been unsuccessful in their challenges to instructional time
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(6) zoning;77 (7) consumer protection; 78 (8) student reporting; 79 (9) test-

ing;80 (10) state licensing;
dance

services.8 3

t

(11) community interaction;82 and (12) gui-

The most controversial of these regulations are

programmatic ones which govern actual teaching practices in nonpublic schools, including curriculum, textbook, and teacher certification.

76.

77.

78.
79.
80.

81.

82.
83.

statutes and regulations. "Kentucky and North Carolina legislation prohibiting private
schools from operating on a term shorter than that of public schools and North Carolina
regulations setting minimum hours for the school day and for daily teacher presence, were
all upheld by the respective state courts without serious question." Note, supra note 69, at
821. The Nebraska Supreme Court also upheld an instructional time provision. Faith Baptist, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571. An Ohio instructional time provision, however, was
held unconstitutional. Whisner, 47 Ohio St.2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750.
Teacher certification laws were found unconstitutional in Ohio, Kentucky, and Michigan.
Whisner, 47 Ohio St.2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750;Rudasill,589 S.W.2d 877; State v. Nobel, No.
S-7-91-9114-A, slip op. (Mich. Dist. Ct., Dec. 12, 1979). Teacher certification laws were upheld in North Carolina, North Dakota, and Nebraska. Columbus ChristianAcademy, (Wake
County, N.C., Super. Ct.); Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883; Faith Baptist, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d
571. Cases are now pending in Maine, Michigan, Iowa, and Nebraska. BangorBaptist, Sheridan Road, Pruessner,and Bible Baptist, supra note 73.
Zoning might represent the largest subject of litigation between fundamentalists and the state
(conversation with Charles Craze, Fundamentalist Attorney). One case where fundamentalists prevailed was the New Hampshire case, City of Concord v. New Testament Baptist
Church, 118 N.H. 56, 382 A.2d 377 (1978). One case where fundamentalists were defeated
was in Oregon. Damascus Community Church v. Clackamus County, 45 Or. App. 1065, 610
P.2d 273 (1980).
Although not involving a fundamentalist school, a Puerto Rican consumer protection statute
was held unconstitutional as it applied to religious schools. Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73 (Ist Cir. 1979).
Fundamentalists generally do not challenge student reporting requirements. Where they
have, they have lost. See, e.g., the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision, Attorney General
v. Bailey, I, 386 Mass. 367 (1982).
"Christian schools have generally been willing to submit their 'product' voluntarily to reasonable evaluation by the State through achievement testing." Note, State Regulation of Private Religious Schools in North Carolina-AModelApproach, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 405,
416 (1980). Christian school leaders, however, have expressed concern that the state may
impose otherwise impermissible curriculum requirements through extensive testing. See W.
BALL, supra note 29, at 337-338. It should also be noted that many Christian school leaders
and some courts contend that the state can satisfy its interest in education by requiring that
Christian school students take and perform satisfactorily a nationally recognized achievement test. See Murreen,supra note 17, Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d at 884. See also Devins, supra
note 14. This position, however, has been rebuked by some commentators and courts. See
Note supra note 69, at 817 and FaithBaptist, 207 Neb. at 815-16, 301 N.W.2d at 579-80.
Fundamentalists generally challenge broad state licensing laws which permit state education
bureaucracies to promulgate regulations governing equality of education. In reference to
this legislation, William Ball has commented:
[Much of it] has been sloppily drafted... much of the regulatory matters... [are]
incredibly poor stuff, embracing leaking definitions, internal contradictions, resolute
departures from statutory authority, vagueness, all manner of unenforceable precatory language, and, withal, greedy, unconstitutional overreaching in every direction.
W. BALL, supra note 29, at 10- 11. Despite these criticisms, courts have upheld this general
authority in Hawaii, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Nebraska. State v. Fellowship of
Christian Pilgrims, - Hawaii -, 651 P.2d 473 (1982); Columbus ChristianAcademy (Wake
County, N.C., Super. Ct.); Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883; FaithBaptist, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d
571. Fundamentalists have prevailed, however, on this issue in Ohio, Kentucky, and Vermont. Whisner, 47 Ohio St.2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750; Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877; State v.
LaBarge, 134 Vt. 276, 357 A.2d 121 (1976). But see State ex rel. Nagle v. Olin, 64 Ohio St.2d
341, 415 N.E.2d 279 (1980). Cases are now pending in Maine, Michigan, and Nebraska.
Bangor Baptist, Sheridan Road, Bible Baptist, supra note 73.
Fundamentalists successfully challenged community interaction provisions in Ohio.
Whisner, 47 Ohio St.2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750; Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877.
This sort of provision was found unconstitutional in Kentucky Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877.
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States with programmatic regulations contend that such regulations are
necessary to assure that "students in nonpublic schools attain a certain
minimum standard of education necessary for the welfare of the child
and society."8 4
Considering the great diversity in approaches to implementing
these regulations and the fact that there is no known correlation be-

tween any programmatic state regulation and educational achievement,
it seems that the threshold decision "to regulate" and the subsequent

decisions of "what to regulate" is, for the most part, a matter of abstract
(albeit sincere) policy preferences among state lawmakers. State
lawmakers justify their decision to regulate private schools under one
of two competing rationales,
namely the "other guy" approach and the
85

"cookie cutter" approach.

The "other guy" approach holds that if

there are no regulations, parents will abuse the system and cause the

"miseducation" of their children. 86 Under this rationale, regulations
are appropriate in those instances where a state cannot afford to trust
parents to direct the upbringing of their children.

7

The "cookie cut-

ters" approach holds that socialization is as significant a part of schooling as the learning of academic lessons. Thus, under the "cookie
cutter" approach, the state ought to make private schools as much like

public schools as the constitution permits. In other words, cultural pluralism, for the "cookie cutter" is a negative.
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED INTERESTS
The Right of Parental Control
In the 1920's, the Supreme Court decided three cases which recognized that the state was limited in the types of regulations it could impose on private schools. The first case, Meyer v. Nebraska,88 involved a
state regulation which required that English be the language of instruction in all schools in the state through the eighth grade. Under this
84.

85.

S. WALTHER, STATE REGULATION OF NONPUBLIC SCHooLs 27 (1982) (Ph.D. Dissertation).
These labels are borrowed from Robert Baker's essay, StatuteLaw and JudicialInterpretation
in THE TWELVE YEAR SENTENCE (Rickenbecker ed. 1974). Mr. Baker used these two labels

to explain alternative rationales for compulsory education.
86. This rationale does not extend to fears--on the part of the state--that parents will be tricked
into sending their children to fraudulent private schools. Curiously, this notion that the state
ought to be paternalistic in its treatment of parents as consumers for their children's education has never been advanced by the state. William Ball sought to discredit this type of
parent paternalism as a possible rationale for state controls over nonpublic education Ball
claimed:
I believe that the parents, the children and the public are well protected by the "parent market" factor. There are plenty of laws to protect parents and children against
fraudulent or dangerous schools. These laws can be, and are, enforced in all fifty
states, and there is no good reason for imposing an overlay of additional structures of
law in view of that fact.
W. BALL, supra note 58, at 12.
87. Different people, obviously, will draw this line in different places. For example, a B.F. Skinner type would permit for fairly intrusive regulations under an "other guy" rationale. On the
other hand, a John Stuart Mill type would allow only the slightest amount of regulation.
88. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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regulation, a private school teacher had been held criminally culpable
for teaching German to an elementary school student. The Court
found the regulation unconstitutional because, "[a teacher's] right to
teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children . . . are within the liberty of the [fourteenth] amendment." 9
Expanding on Meyer, the Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,9" explicitly recognized the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their
children. In Pierce, the Court held unconstitutional an Oregon statute
which required all children to attend public schools. The Court ruled
that the State could not outlaw private schooling and that
[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all government in this
Union repose, excludes any general power over the state to standardize
its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers
only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty,
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.9 '
In the last of the 1920's decisions, Farringtonv. Tokushiage,92 the
Court held unconstitutional a statute which sought to promote the
"Americanism" of pupils attending foreign language schools in the territory of Hawaii. This legislation "empowered the territorial government to prescribe the schools' courses of study, entrance and
attendance qualifications, and textbooks; to require their teachers to
satisfy certain standards; to limit hours of operation and the pupils who
may attend them; to freely inspect material, facilities and teaching; and
to collect fees, issue permits and require reporting to insure compliance." 93 The Court held that these regulations violated the parents'
due process rights and their right to control their children's education. 94
The significance of the right of parental control to future challenges
of state regulation is questionable. First, the regulations involved in
the Pierce, Meyer, and Farringtoncases were unusual. The regulation
89. Id at 400.
90. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
91. Id at 535. The Court, however, recognized that:
No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all
schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require
that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good
moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good
citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to

the public welfare.
Id at 534.
92. 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
93. S. WALTHER, supra note 84, at 39.
94. The Court stated:
They give affirmative direction concerning the intimate and essential details of such
schools, their control to public officers, and deny both owners and patrons reasonable
choice and discretion in respect of teachers, curriculum, and textbooks. Enforcement
of the Act probably would destroy most, if not all, of them; and, certainly it would
deprive parents of fair opportunity to procure for their children instruction which
they think important and we cannot say is harmful. The Japanese parent has the right
to direct the education of his own child.
273 U.S. at 298.
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in Meyer was not related to a legitimate state interest, and the statutes
in Pierce and Farringtonwould have completely eliminated the private
school options. Most state regulations which apply to private religious
schools are related to a legitimate state interest and are not as obtrusive
as in the 1920's cases.9 5 Second, the judiciary in the 1920's was extremely protective of individual rights which seemed threatened by any
form of governmental action.9 6 Presently, the Supreme Court explicitly
recognizes the constitutionality of reasonable state regulations of private schools which promote a compelling state interest in education. In
Board of Education v. Allen ,97 for example, Court observed that
[s]ince Pierce, a substantial body of case law has confirmed the power
of the States to insist that attendance at private schools, if it is to satisfy
state compulsory-attendance laws, be at institutions which provide
minimum hours of instruction, 'employ teachers of specified training,
and cover prescribed subjects of instruction.9 8
In other words, "if the State must satisfy its interest in secular education through the instrument of private schools, it has a proper interest
in the manner in which those schools perform their secular educational
function." 99 Numerous other Supreme Court decisions have recognized the rights of states to impose reasonable regulations on its private
schools."° But the Supreme Court has yet to determine where the line
separating
reasonable from unreasonable state regulations should be
01
drawn.
The Religion Clauses
Fundamentalist Christian educators claim that a constitutionally
unjustifiable stranglehold is being placed on their religious liberty by
state laws and bureaucracies. Countering the fundamentalists' position, the state alleges that the existing structure of state laws is the least
intrusive means available to satisfy the state's compelling interest in the
education of its young. The resolution of these confficting views of
state authority is primarily based on the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses of the First Amendment. 0" The Free Exercise clause pro95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See, e.g., supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 32 (Goldstein & Gee ed. 1980).
392 U.S. 236 (1968).
Id at 245-247.
Id at 247.
See references listed in Note, supra note 69, at 811-812 n.59.
See Devins, supra note 14.
In addition to these First Amendment claims, fundamentalist educators often challenge state
laws and regulations on void-for-vagueness and due process grounds. See, e.g., BangorBap549 F. Supp. 1208; and Whisner, 47 Ohio St.2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750. The fundamentaltist,
ists successfully challenged Ohio's regulatory scheme on both of these grounds in Whisner.
On the void-for-vagueness claim, the fundamentalists' success can be attributed to the
inability of Ohio's Director of Elementary and Secondary Education to clearly articulate the
meaning of the regulations. This is borne out in the Director's cross-examination by defense

council:
Q.

The minimum standard on page 22 states: 'educational facilities, pupil-teacher
ratio, instructional materials, and services at the elementary level are comparable
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hibits the government from unnecessarily interfering in religiously
based practices. The Establishment Clause, in part, bars the state from
fostering an excessive government entanglement with religion.
The FreeExercise Clause. The test normally applied in determining
to those of the upper levels'. Now is that a standard which governs elementary
schools? What does that provision means to you, Mr. Brown?
A. It means that the elementary and secondary should be a comparable school system, that the secondary should not assume and take away all the money and
infringe upon the elementary. There should be an equality of the money, staff,
and so forth.
Q. Now, Mr. Brown, take as an example the administrator of Tabernacle Christian
School. He reads this statement and he is saying, 'What does the state want of
me?' What does it require of us?' And he reads, my educational facilities, our
pupil-teacher ratio, our instructional materials and our services at this elementary level must be comparable to those of the upper levels. What do the words,
'upper levels,' means? Does it mean high school?
A. Comparing between elementary and secondary.
Q. 'Upper levels' refers to secondary-what part of a secondary level is referred to?
What grade of high school is referred to?
A. Normally. . . ninth through twelfth.
Q. Normally ninth through twelfth. Are you telling me the elementary school must
then be comparable to grades nine through twelve, all four grades of high school,
in ratio, services, facilities, and materials?
A. The comparability there would be as far as one school handling elementary and
secondary. There would be equitable expenditures between the two.
Q. The regulation speaks of educational facilities. What is an educational facility,
Mr. Brown?
A. It is a school building.
Q. It is a school building. It is not an expenditure, it is a school building, and my
elementary school building must then be comparable to high school building. Is
that what you told us this means?
A. If you have a high school.
Q. What if you don't have one?
A. Then you can't compare it.
Q. Mr. Brown, do you understand what this provision means?
A. Yes.
W. BALL, supra note 29, at 11-12.
On the due process claim, the Whisner court held that the state violated the right of
parents to direct the upbringing of their children. This general right is based in the due
process clause. See discussion of Meyer, Pierce, and Farringtonsupra notes 88 to 96 and
accompanying text. The Whisner Court held:
The "minimum standards" under attack herein effectively repose power in the state
Department of Education to control the essential elements of nonpublic education in
the state . . . [Consequently,] the right of appellants to direct the upbringing and
education of their children in a manner which they deem advisable, indeed essential,
and which we cannot say is harmful, has been denied by application of the state's
"minimum standards" as to them.
351 N.E.2d at 770.
Other courts have not ruled for the fundamentalists on these grounds noting that "The
Ohio minimum standards were self-contradictory and extreme in their effort to achieve
equivalency in public and private education." Shaver, 294 N.W.2d at 898. See also Faith
Baptist, 207 Neb. at 814-15, 301 N.W.2d at 578-79.
It should be noted that the First Amendment claim (the right of parents to direct the
religious upbringing of their children) is a stronger claim than the due process a stronger
claim. See Runyon v. McCrary 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976) and Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S.
205, 215-16 (1972). Also, a statute found unconstitutional on void-for vagueness could be
recrafted so as to be clear but just as intrusive.
Finally, fundamentalist separationists do not raise the establishment clause defense (although they will make due process and void-for vagueness claims). See supra note 58. See
also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-34 (1972).
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whether regulation of religiously motivated conduct violates the free
exercise clause requires a three-part determination:
(1) whether the challenge is motivated by, and rooted in, a legitimately and sincerely held religious belief;
(2) whether and to what extent state regulations burden free exercise
rights; and
(3) whether any
such burden is justified by a sufficiently compelling
03
state interest.'

Government regulation which significantly burdens the free exercise of

religion cannot withstand constitutional challenge unless it represents
"the least restrictive means to achieve some compelling state interest." °4 But the exemption of a religious activity from regulation is not
constitutionally required where it would "unduly interfere with fulfillment of the (compelling) government interest."' 5
The starting point in any free exercise clause analysis is a recogni-

tion that although laws cannot interfere with mere religious beliefs and
opinions, they may interfere with practices. In Reynolds v. United
States,10 6 the Supreme Court explained, in upholding the conviction of

a Mormon under a federal anti-polygamy statute, that "[l]aws are made
for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with

mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices."'0 7 In
103. BangorBaptist, 549 F. Supp. at 1217. The free exercise standard was articulated in a signifi-

cantly different manner by the U.S. Supreme Court in Thomas v. Review Board: "The state
may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of
achieving some compelling state interest." 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). Under Thomas, once a
showing has been made that religious practice is burdened by a governmental program, the
state must demonstrate both that its regulation furthers some compelling interest and that the
regulation is the least restrictive means available for furthering that interest. Apparently, the
Thomas test does not address questions such as: to what extent does the government program infringe on religious practice or is the religious liberty interest so strong as to overbalance a compelling state interest. The Yoder test does raise these questions.
Because of these differences, it is hard to say whether a definitive standard of review
exists in free exercise clause litigation. In applying the Yoder test, one court recently noted:
The constitutional analysis of cases arising under the free exercise clause is generally
tailored to the particular factual situation at hand. This approach is different from
.cases
c
arising under the establishment of the religious clause. . . where a wellenunciated and broadly applicable test has been established.
State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d at 890-91.
Others, however, have criticized the free exercise standard as being too rigid in application. Paul Marcus, for example, contended that:
The major inadequacy of the current balancing test. . . is its failure to encompass a
necessary third step (an ad hoc balance of the importance of the state's interest against
the importance of the individual's interest) in its review. The Court takes its first step
in determining whether they have been infringed by the state. It then takes the second
step in deciding whether or not the state has a compelling interest for its action, an
interest which could not be promoted by any less restrictive action. If the state interest is compelling, the Court stops and the state automatically wins, even if the individual's interest is exceptionally compelling.

104.
105.
106.
107.

Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying StandardsUnder the Free Exercise Clause, 1973
DUKE L.J. 1217, 1245. See also Weeks & Devins, FirstAmendment FreeExercise Protections,
LEX COLLEGI, Summer 1980, at 1.
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
The Court contended that its decision was based in the principles of organized government:
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other words
the Amendment embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second

cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of
society. The freedom to act must have apropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that protection.

Thus while some degree of government regulation over religious
activities is permissible, striking a balance between legitimate governmental regulation and impermissible government dominion is a task
that the judiciary confronts. Free Exercise Clause analysis is triggered
when some state action infringes upon an individual's right to freely
practice his religion. The threshold issue in free exercise litigation,
therefore, is a determination of "the magnitude of the statute's impact
upon the exercise of religious belief."' 0 9
In Brown v. Dade ChristianSchools Inc. ,1"' a plurality of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Dade Christian's contention that its
segregationist admissions policy was grounded in religious doctrine.
For that Court,
[although] a belief [need not] be permanently recorded in written form
to be religious in nature.

. .

the absence of references to school segre-

gation in written literature stating the church's beliefs . . . is 1strong
evidence that school segregation is not the exercise of religion."

Additionally, some courts have held that, to be cognizable for First
Amendment purposes, a belief must be central to the religion." 2 In
Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 13 for example, the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied the "centrality of belief' concept
to deny the Cherokee Indian Nation injunctive relief to prevent the
flooding of land sacred to the Cherokee Nation.
Granting as we do that the individual plaintiffs sincerely adhere to a

108.
109.

110.

111.

112.
113.

Can a man excuse his (illegal) practices. . . because of his religious belief?. To permit
this would be to make the professed doctrine of religious belief superior to the law of
the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.
Id at 166-167.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304 (1940).
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 488 (5th
Cir. 1980). But see the discussion of the Thomas standard, supra note 103, which suggests
that the threshold question is whether the government action negatively impacts on religious
belief.
556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977). The Christian school involved in Brown claimed that it was not
bound by the Supreme Court decision which held that minority students could not be denied
admission to private schools solely because of their race. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976). The basis of this decision was the right to contract protection of § 1981 of the Civil
Rights Act. The Runyon Court, however, explicitly left open the question of whether there
was a valid free exercise defense to this § 1981 right.
556 F.2d at 312. See also Fiedler v. Marunsco Christian School, 631 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1980)
where the court held that a church school could not raise a free exercise clause defense since
it did not demonstrate that its pastor's arguably religious belief in racial separation was the
church's belief.
See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 859-65 (1978).
620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
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draws the spiritual strength from feelings of kin-

ship with nature, they have fallen short of demonstrating that worship
at the particular geographic location in question is inseparable from
their way of life, the cornerstone of their religious observance,
1 14 or plays
the central role in their religious ceremonies or practices.

Under this restrictive Dade Christian-Sequoyah view, free exercise
analysis will be triggered if the belief (1) is clearly expressed either in
the literature or traditions of religion and (2) is central to their religion.
Most courts do not follow the Dade Christian-Sequoyah view, and for
good reason.
As Judge Goldberg pointed out in a special concurrence filed in
Dade Christian:
One person's heresy can be another's religion. It is extremely important that religion be defined in such a manner that labeling does not
become the touchstone of constitutional analysis. Religions can have

abhorrent principles; most religious practices are benign, benevolent,
and beneficient. But we should not judge a religion by its practices.
One era's spiritual error is another's heralded religion. 1 5
Supreme Court precedents support the Goldberg view.1 16 In United
114. 620 F.2d at 1164. See also Frank v. Alaska, 604 82d 1068 (1979); People v. Woody, 394 82d
813 (1964); and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
115. Brown, 556 F.2d at 317 (Goldberg, J., special concurrence).
116. Laurence Tribe, for example, contends that "For the free exercise clause. . . all that is 'arguably religious' should be considered religious in a free exercise analysis." L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 828 (1978). This contention is supported by a number of
Supreme Court decisions. In United States v. Ballard, the Court held that "the truth or
verity of religious doctrines or beliefs" could not be considered by a judge or jury without
violating the free exercise clause. 322 U.S. 7-8, 96 (1944). Similarly, in Fowler v. Rhode
Island, the Court held that "it is not the business of courts to say what is a religious practice
or activity for one group is not religious under the protection of the First Amendment." 345
U.S. 67, 69-70 (1953).
The fact that anything "arguably religious" ought to trigger free exercise clause analysis
does not displace the "centrality of belief' standard from free exercise clause analysis.
Under the Yoder test, "centrality" is clearly a significant factor in the determination of
whether the government imposed infringement on religion is justifiable. At the same time, a
belief which is not the sine qua non of a particular faith still ought to be protected by the free
exercise clause. See L. TRIBE at 862. Additionally, the argument that courts should assign
the same value to all beliefs seems well-founded. As J. Morris Clark noted:
When the objector is a member of a traditional religion, it may in some cases be
possible to determine the strength of his belief by the relationship it bears to the theology as a whole. Some sins are venial, others mortal. But the difficulty of pronouncing
judicially upon matters of theological complexity must be emphasized: as one recent
ote has aptly observed, "Where an act is ritualistic and the government contests its
centrality to the particular religion the courts must act as the final arbiter in questions
of religious doctrine-questions more appropriately decided by prelates than judges."
Clark, Guidelinesfor the FreeExercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REv.327, 343 (1969).
Finally, the "centrality" concept lends itself to arbitrary application. The North Dakota
Supreme Court, in State v. Shaver, for example, held that a perusal of the record fails to
disclose a deeply-rooted religious conviction against the use of certified teachers in the Bible
Baptist School." 294 N.W.2d at 894. The basis of this conclusion was the fact that the school
would permit certified fundamentalist teachers to teach at the school. This reasoning is misguided for it assumes that there will be a sufficient number of certified fundamentalist teachers ready, willing, and able to teach at the school. See supra note 28. Deference to the
sincerity and veracity of religious belief, however, does not preclude some judicial inquiry to
guard against fraudulent religious clause claims. According to Professor Tribe, "full protection of the values underlying the first amendment suggests that any test of sincerity as a
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for example, the Court defined "sincere religious

belief' in very broad terms. Construing a statutory requirement that
military consciencious objector status should be based in belief "in a
relation to a Supreme Being," the Court characterized the question as
whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place
in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in
God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption where such beliefs
have parallel positions on the lives of their respective holders we cannot say that one is "in relation to a Supreme Being" and the other is
not.' 8
Thus some commentators have noted that individual morality can be
characterized as a sincere religious belief.119 This standard makes
sense.' 20 There is no reason to suspect that an allegation of belief is
insincere, unless some "clear and convincing" proof suggesting otherwise is adduced at trial.
The line distinguishing permissible from impermissible government
conduct which infringes on religious freedom is not clearly drawn.' 2 '
This confusion results from a standard of review in free exercise litigation structured so as to grant the fact finder great discretion in determining both the nature of the infringement on religious liberty and
whether the state is using the least restrictive means available to it to
further some compelling government interest. 22 Under this standard
the government clearly cannot justify a particular regulatory scheme by
the mere assertion that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter in
question. According to Professor Laurence Tribe:

117.
118.
119.
120.

121.
122.

prerequisite of exemption must be strictly limited to inquiries of this relatively neutral sort
ublications or public claims of religious claimants), so that agents of government cannot
readily bend the test to their religious prejudices." L. TRIBE, at 862. It should also be noted
that an extensive government investigation into the "centrality of belief' in a religious liberty
claim might independently violate the entanglement prong of the establishment clause test.
See infra notes 132 to 139. Finally, the risk of fraudulent claims is one that we must take
because "no one would limit the first amendment to the official orthodoxy of the relatively
few religions that have elaborate dogmas." Note, Toward.4 ConstitutionallDefinitionofReligion, 91 HAMv. L. REv. 1056, 1080 (1978).
380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Id at 166.
See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342-343 (1970) (purely ethical and moral considerations held to be religious), and J. WHITEHEAD supra note 28, at 108.
Religion is clearly a personal matter and thus it is proper for the courts to recognize it as
such. This "individualization" of religion was recently recognized by the Supreme Court in
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981). In Thomas, the Court upheld Thomas' First
Amendment claims to receive employment compensation because he could not in good conscience assist in the manufacture of Army tanks. In Thomas, the Court based its free exercise
analysis on the premise that "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection." Id at 714. Consequently, the Court did not find controlling the facts that Thomas was struggling with his
beliefs; that he was not able to articulate his beliefs precisely; or that other members of the
same religious order could work in the munitions plant. Instead, the Court claimed that:
Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation. The narrow function of a reviewing court. . . is to determine whether. . petitioners terminated his word because of
an honest conviction that such work was forbidden by his religion.
450 U.S. at 716.
See Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 720-27 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See Devins, supra note 14.
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In applying the least intrusive alternative-compelling interest requirement, it is crucial to avoid the error of equating the state's interest in
denying an exemption with the state's usually much greater interest in
maintaining the underlying rule of program for unexceptional cases.
constitutionOnly the first interest-that in denying an exemption-is
23
ally relevant when an exemption is sought.'
Professor Marcus summarizes the results of earlier free exercise
cases as follows:
The free exercise "losers" have been Mormons who have served life
sentences for practicing polygamy, and independently lost the right to
vote; conscientious objectors who could not attend state-run universities, and could not, for a period, become naturalized citizens of the
United States; Jehovah's Witnesses who, for a time, would be required
to pay flat license fees to sell their religious text, and still presumably
can be prohibited from having their children sell or distribute religious
literature in public; and Black Muslims, who have had an uphill 1battle
24
in asserting their right to practice their religion while in prison.
Despite Supreme Court decisions permitting restrictions on religious
liberty in a number of areas, the Supreme Court has been more responsive to religious liberty claims for the past twenty years. 25
The turning point in Supreme Court free exercise analysis was the
1963 Sherbert v. Verner' 26 decision. Sherbert upheld a Sabatarian's
right to refuse Saturday work and still receive unemployment benefits.
In Sherbert, the Court promulgated the compelling interest-least restrictive means standard.' 2 7 The Court also established the fundamental rule that
[w]here the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit
because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate
his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion may
be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial. . . . Government may [not]. . . penalize or discriminate against
individuals or groups because they hold religious views abhorrent to
poweA" to inhibit the dissemithe authorities. . . nor employ the taxing
28
nation of particular religious views.'
This rule, although framed in terms of economic benefits or penalties,
is equally applicable to government regulation. In the case of government regulations contrary to religious beliefs, an individual or institution will be pressured to forego its conflicting religious belief or else
risk such government sanctions as jail sentence or the forceable closure
123. L. TRIBE, supra note 112, at 855.

124. Marcus, supra note 103, at 1219.

125. See Note, GeneralLaws, NeutralPrincoples,and the FreeExercise Clause, 33 VAND. L. REv.

149 (1980).
126. 347 U.S. 398 (1963).
127. Id at 407-09.
128. Id at 402.
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129
of the nonconforming operation.
The ultimate issue in distinguishing permissible from impermissible
government action is the degree of proof required in applying the Sherbert test. 130 If the government need only demonstrate that its regulation is arguably the least restrictive means available to achieve some
compelling government interest, the state will have considerable discretion in promulgating regulations which impact on religious freedom. If
the government must introduce "clear and convincing" evidence that
its regulatory scheme satisfied the least restrictive means-compelling interest standard, however, the state will be forced to act very cautiously
when it promulgates regulations which impact on religious liberty
interest.
The Establishment Clause. The establishment clause requires that
government action, "first, must reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose. . . second, [it] must have a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion. . . and, third, must avoid excessive governmental
entanglement with religion."'' In Bangor Baptist Church v. State, 3 2
the court discussed the importance of the excessive entanglement concept in establishment clause litigation:
An unconstitutional entanglement generally involves 'the government's continuing monitoring or potential for regulating the religious
activity under scrutiny.'
.'In determining whether there is entanglement, the question is
"whether particular acts in question are intended to establish or interfere with religious beliefs or practices or have the effect of doing
so."

133

The excessive entanglement prong of the establishment clause is often
as a list of prohibited entanglement that government may
viewed
34
not: 1

(1) involve itself in "continuing day-to-day relationships" with such
pervasively religious schools;
(2) have relationships with church-schools which involve an "element
of governmental evaluation and standards;"
(3) carry out legislation or regulations which create situations readily
leading to "confrontations and conflicts" between government
and churches;
129. This is precisely what happened in Nebraska where a fundamentalist pastor went to jail after
refusing to comport with state regulations governing his church school. While in jail, the
state had shut down his school. (It should be noted that a court of final determination had
previously upheld the constitutionality of these regulations.) See Miller, Fundamentalists
Fight Nebraska over School, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1982, at Al; The Police Lock a Baptist
Church, supra note 58.
130. See Boothby, supra note 14.
131. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973)

(citations omitted).
132. 549 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Me. 1982).
133. Id at 1221 (citations omitted).
134. W. BALL, MEMORANDUM TO OUR

FUNDAMENTALIST

CHRISTIAN FRIENDS AND OTHER

FRIENDS OF RELIGIONS LIBERTY, Apr. 14, 1981, at 3-4 (case citations omitted).
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(4) have "programs whose very nature is apt to entangle the state in

details of administration;"
(5) have a "sustained and detailed relationship [with church institutions] for enforcement of statutory and administrative standards;"
(6) employ, in respect to relationships between teachers and children
(7)
(8)
(9)

in church-schools, "comprehensive methods of surveillance and
control;"
engage in inspection of church institutional records;
carry out legislation or regulations which create situation requiring "negotiations" between church institutions and government;
have relationships with church institutions which have even the
"potential" for the foregoing entanglements.

Some degree of government entanglement is permissible.
Churches, for example, are presently subject to both tax and audit in
regard to their business income.13 5 Once government involvement has
been established, the state must demonstrate that its regulatory scheme
meets the least restrictive means-compelling interest test.'3 6 In
Surinach v. Pesquerade Busquets,13 1 the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit stated that:
in the sensitive area of First Amendment religious freedoms, the burden is upon the state to show that implementation of a regulatory
scheme will not ultimately infringe upon and entangle it in the affairs
of a religion3 8 to an extent to which the Constitution will not
countenance. 1

Establishment clause concerns, however, are not triggered unless there
is some risk that governmental regulations will impose a "superior regime of official orthodoxy"' 39 on a religious belief or practice.
135. See Simon, The Tax-Exempt Status ofRacially DiscriminatoryReligious Schools, 36 TAX L.
REv. 477, 507 (1981); and Worthing, Government Surveillanceof Religious Organizations,23
J. CHURCH & STATE 551 (1981).
136. See Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73, 79-80 (lst Cir. 1979) and BangorBaptist,
549 F. Supp. at 1222. See also Thomas, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), and Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
137. 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 179).
138. Id at 75-76.
139. Brief for Petitioners (Bob Jones University) at 31, Bob Jones University v. United States 813. Violations of the excessive entanglement prong of the establishment clause can be made
prospectively by a court. This is evidenced by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision
m Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. N.L B.
The whole tenor of the Religion Clauses cases involving state aid to schools is that
there does not have to be an actual trial run to determine whether the aid can be
segregated, received and retained as to secular activities only, but it is sufficient to
strike the aid down that a reasonable likelihood of possibility of entanglement exists.
559 F.2d 1112, 1126 (7th Cir. 1977), aft'd on statutory grounds, 440 U.S. 409 (1979). Thus
"the danger that pervasive modem governmental power will ultimately intrude on religion
[is in] conflict with the Religion Clauses." Week and Devins, supra note 158, at 2. As James
Madison stated in his Memorial and RemonstranceAgainst Religious Assessments:
[lit is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. . . the free men of
American did not wait till usurped power had strengthened itself by exercise, and
entangled the question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in the principle,
and they avoided the consequences by denying the principle.
Quoted in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 63 (1977).
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THE SOLUTION

The courts thus far have been unable to provide consistent guidance
either to the states or to the fundamentalist schools involved in state
regulation lawsuits."4 In fact, many of the existing decisions are totally at odds with each other.'4 1 And this includes decisions from the
same state court 142 and decisions involving identical regulations-all
applying the "same" legal standards. 143 Poor lawyering on the part of
some state prosecutors'" and Christian school attornies 45 offers partial
explanation for this judicial failure. Varying regulatory schemes are
also at issue. 146 More significant, however, these cases often present

courts with an apparently hopeless entanglement of fact, judgment, secular values, and religious conviction.
The primary failure of the courts has been the failure to make careful factual determinations. 147 To a large extent, the outcome of cases
involving state regulation of Christian schools often hinge on whether
the courts prefer unrestrained parental choice in education or state control over some of the essential components of Christian education.

Even Supreme Court guidance may not ensure uniformity since these
140. See Devins, supra note 14; and Devins, supra note 52.
141. See Devins, supra note 14.
142. Compare State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St.2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976) with State ex rel. Nagle
v. Olin, 64 Ohio St.2d 341, 415 N.E.2d 279 (1980). According to William Ball:
The Ohio Supreme Court, the Olin case has now opened the door to extensive state
regulation of religious schools. The Court, while agreeing that the state regulations
held unconstitutional in Whisner were unreasonable, goes on to say, "We believe that
such a set of less restrictive standards could, and should, be adopted."
Memo from William Ball re: State v. Olin (Jan. 30, 1981).
143. See infra note 209-221, and Devins, supra note 73. It should be noted that there are slight
variances in the statutes involved in these cases. But these variances do not explain the
tremendous variations in court decisions on this matter.
144. See Whisner, 47 Ohio St.2d at 217-18, 351 N.E.2d at 771 ("In the face of the record before us,
and in light of the expert testimony ... it is difficult to imagine a state interest of sufficient
magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.") and
State v. Nobels, S 791-0114-A (Allegan City, Mich.) slip op. at 8 ("No evidence has been
introduced in this case that would demonstrate that the State has a compelling interest in
applying teaching certification laws to the Nobels.")
145. The Christian Laiv Association, which refuses to raise the entanglement issue, lost significant
cases in Nebraska, North Dakota, and Massachusetts. Faith Baptist, 207 Neb. 802, 301
N.W.2d 571; Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883; GraceBible, supra note 73. The Christian Law Association's technical victory in Ohio is generally considered a setback for the fundamentalist
cause. Olin, 64 Ohio St.2d 341, 415 N.E.2d 279. The Shaver and Olin decisions both point to
possible deficiencies in the trial record. In Shaver, the court claimed "No attempt was made
at trial to show how compliance with the law would affect the religion of the parents or their
children ...
A perusal of the record fails to disclose a deeply rooted religious conviction
against the use of certified teachers" 294 N.W.2d at 894. In Olin, William Bal commented:
"Nor does the record show that there was any development whatever for the issue of compelling state interest. . . Also it does not appear that discovery was employed." Ball, supra
note 142, at 2.
146. See supra note 67. These variances, not surprisingly, are relied upon by courts in distinguishing surfacely inconsistent judicial holdings. See Shaver, 294 N.W.2d at 898, 899 (distinguishing Whisner and Rudasill), Faith Baptist, 207 Neb. at 814-15, 301 N.W.2d at 578-79
(distinguishing Whisner and Rudasill), Bangor Baptist, 549 F. Supp. at 1218 (distinguishing
Faith Baptist) and Olin, 64 Ohio St.2d 353-54, 415 N.E.2d at 287-288 (distinguishing Whisner
and Shaver).
147. This can be attributed in part to the failure of attorneys to develop factual records. See supra
notes 144 & 145, and Weeks & Devins, supra note 103.
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cases are easily distinguishable due to the incredible variety among
challenged regulatory schemes.1 48 Courts ultimately must apply a simiof review, however, to ensure consistent decisionmaking in
lar standard
149
this area.

The current state of judicial decisionmaking in Christian school
lawsuits is apparent in the varying judicial perceptions of teacher certification requirements. In Kentucky State Boardv. Rudasill, 5 the Kentucky Supreme Court, in holding such teacher certification
requirements unconstitutional, contended that
[i]t cannot be said as an absolute that a teacher in a nonpublic school
will be unable to instruct children to become intelligent citi...
zens. . . . [T]he receipt of 'a bachelor's degree from a standard college
or university' is an indicator of the level of achievement, but it is not a
sine qua non the absence of which establishes that private and parochial school teachers are unable51 to teach their students to intelligently
exercise the elective franchise.1
The Ohio Supreme Court' 52 and a Michigan trial court 153 have similarly held such certification requirements unconstitutional.
In stark contradiction to these decisions, the Nebraska Supreme
Court upheld
154 a teacher certification requirement in State v. FaithBaptist Church. That court thought that
it cannot be fairly disputed that such a requirement is neither arbitrary
not unreasonable[. A]dditionally, we believe it is also a reliable indicator of the probability of success in that particular field. We believe that
in the
it goes without saying that the State has a compelling interest 55
quality and ability of those who are to teach its young people.'
The North Dakota Supreme Court 156 and a North Carolina trial
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

153.

154.
155.
156.

See supra notes 67 & 146.
See Devins, supra note 14.
589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979).
Id at 884.
In State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St.2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976), the Ohio Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a teacher certification requirement
In the face of the record before us, and in light of the expert testimony. [I]t is difficult
to imagine a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming
protection under the free exercise clause. . . . We will not, therefore, attempt to conjure up such an interest in order to sustain application of the 'minimum standards' to
these appellants.
Id at 217-18, 351 N.E.2d at 771.
In State v. Nobel, 5-7-91-0114-A (Allegan City, Michigan), a Michigan trial court refused to
enforce a state teacher certification requirement.
No evidence has been introduced in this case that would demonstrate that the state
has a compelling interest in applying the teacher certification law to the Nobels or the
educational interest of the State would not be achieved by a requirement less restrictive on the religious beliefs of the Nobels.
Id at 8.
207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571 (1981).
Id at 579.
In State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980), the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld a
teacher certification law claiming that
courts are ill-equipped to act as school boards and determine the need for discrete
aspects of a compulsory school education program. The Courtroom is simply not the
best arena for the debate of issues of educational policy and the measurement of edu-
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court1 5 7 have used similar reasoning in upholding their respective

teacher certification regulations.
Commentators on this matter, not surprisingly, have assailed the
holdings in each of these groups of cases.' 58 These divergent views
I

cational quality. Although North Dakota's minimal requirement for state approval of
a private or parochial school may be imperfect, without the regulations the state
would have no reasonable assurance that its recognized interest in providing an education for its youth is being protected.
Id at 899-900.
157. In States v. Columbus Christian Academy, No. 78 CVS 1678 (Wake County Super. Ct.), a
North Carolina trial court held that
To insure that the child receives [essential] skills, it is necessary that he be given instruction on basic subjects by individuals who are qualified and competent to teach
those subjects. The statutes and regulations which have been adopted to achieve this
and are based upon sound educational policy and logic.
Id at 14.
158. The Whisner decision was viewed with approval in Carper supra note 14 and with disapproval in Note, Public Regulation of PrivateReligious Schools, 37 OHIO ST. L. J. 899 (1976).
The Faith Baptist case was viewed with approval in Comment, State Regulation of Religious
Education, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 183 (1981) and with disapproval in Commentary, Douglas
v. Faith Baptist Church Under ConstitutionalScrutiny, 51 NEB. L. REV. 74 (1982). The
Rudasill decision was viewed with disapproval in Comment, Regulation of Fundamentalist
Christian Schools.- Free Exercize of Religion vs. the State's Interest in Quality Education, 67
Ky. L. REv. 415 (1979-80) and in Education and Religion, 6 N. Ky. L. REV. 125, 140-151
(1979).
Wendell Bird argued vigorously that courts should heed the legitimate free exercise
claims raised by fundamentalists. In Freedomfrom Establishment and Unneutralityin Public
School Instruction and Religious School Regulation, 1979 HARV. J. OF LAW AND PUB. POL.
125, 191 note 301, Mr. Bird assailed the Columbia Christian Academy rationale:
This holding in Christian Academy was erroneous. And it was based upon the
erroneous assumption that religious instruction does not hinder or prevent locating
theologically acceptable instructors. The court held that "Fundamentalist Christianity contains no specific prohibition against doing any of the things specifically required by the State's regulations," and in particular does not prohibit "the hiring of
certified teachers, the presentation of instruction in certain basic subjects, the provision of textbooks or other instructional materials," or the other requirements. But the
absence of specific injunctions in religious articles of faith does not prevent the occurrence of a burden on free exercise of these regulations. The court misstated the issues,
because while religious beliefs did not prohibit the hiring of certified teachers, they
did require the hiring of theologically acceptable teachers, which was burdened by the
requirement of specified qualifications from accredited universities; while religious
beliefs did not prohibit the presentation of basic instruction, they did govern many
aspects of instruction to secondary school instruction and upper elementary instruction; and while religious convictions did not prohibit provision of textbooks, they did
require use of texts that might not be substantially equivalent to public school texts.
Finally, the holding was based upon the erroneous ruling that the state had a compelling interest that justified these intrusive regulations, because these regulations went
well beyond basic educational courses in which the state possibly has a compelling
interest.
Countering this position, Cynthia West claimed that the Rudasill court was misguided.
[The] trial court found that "[c]ompliance with the various regulations. . . would be
financially impossible for some of the church Plaintiffs." IT]he briefs do not support
this finding, and there is no evidence as to whether regulations would impose such a
burden. Furthermore, in Braunfeld v. Brown, the Supreme Court... stated that
"it cannot be expected, much less required, that legislators enact no law regulating
conduct that may in some way result in an economic disadvantage to some religious sects and not to others because of the special practices of the various religions. We do not believe that such an effect is an absolute test for determining
whether the legislation violates the freedom of religion protected by the First
Amendment."
If educational studies or philosophies conflict in this critical area, and no better
method of assuring that teachers are competent can be suggested, the logic of requir-

1983]

Christian Schools

among courts and commentators, more than anything else, point to the
need for a definitive standard of review on this matter. A definitive

standard of review could follow one of two conflicting modes of analysis: judicial deference to academic judgments made by state education

decisionmakers,' 59 or a requirement that "clear and convincing proof'
must be introduced by the state160to justify an infringement on the fundamental religious liberty right.
Clear and Convincing Proof Standard
The current trend of conflicting court decisionmaking on this matter is not likely to change course. There is a sensible standard of review, however, which should be uniformly applied:
If there is an infringement on a sincerely held religious belief, the
state-in order to demonstrate that this infringement is the least restrictive means to further some compelling state interest-must meet
the evidentiary standard of proof of clear and convincing evidence.
The general standard of civil litigation of preponderance of the evidence is unsatisfactory in light 161
of the "preferential position of religious
freedom and its social impact.

Under this standard, freedom of religion merits the same protection as
freedom of speech. 62 Consequently, courts could justify their willingness to be less deferential in their review of state and local education

decisionmaking-a matter that courts generally prefer to stay out
of 66-under the Supreme Court's Tinker"6 doctrine.
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.,165 the

Court upheld the First Amendment right of public school students to
wear black arm bands to school in protest of the Vietnam War. In so
holding, the Court required that the school must affirmatively establish
that the wearing of these armbands would be disruptive to the educa-

159.
160.
161.
162.

ing teachers to acquire some reasonable level of higher education should override the
speculative fears of the schools that they will be unable to fund certifiable teachers of
their religious faith.
Note, supra note 69, at 825 n.136, 826.
See infra notes 175 & 176.
See infra notes 161 to 174.
Devins, supra note 14 (adopted from Boothby, supra note 14 at 613).
"The burden of proof must rest on government to justify any restraint on free expression
prior to its judicial review and on government to demonstrate the particular facts necessary
to sustain a limitation on suppressive behavior." L. TRIBE, supra note 116 at 7-34. The
Supreme Court articulated the "clear and convincing" proof standard for free expression
cases in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1956):
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in fact finding,
which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest in
a transcending value. . . this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of
placing on the other party the burden of producing a sufficiency of proof. . . Due
process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne
the burden of producing the evidence and convincing the fact-finder of his guilt.
The application of the "clear and convincing" proof standard in individual liberty cases is
discussed in Boothby,
supra note 14 at 620-24.
176.
See infra note

163.
164. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
165. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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tional process. The Court claimed that "It can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the school house gate."'1 66 Similarly, in fundamentalist Christian lawsuits, the state ought to demonstrate that students in fundamentalist schools are not learning as much as their
public school counterparts. 167
Religious freedom is a preferred constitutional protection against
which "only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise
served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."1 6 1 Consequently, it is generally recognized that
[i]t is not enough ... for a state to show that its interest in an educated
citizenry override religious group's general opposition to state regulatory authority over sectarian schools. The state must also justify its
imposed under this auinterest in each specific regulation or standard
169
thority that infringes upon free exercise.
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the need for narrowly
drawn legislation when religious liberty interests are at stake 170 and the
central role of religious liberty in a democratic state, 17 1 it "has never
specified the particular standard of proof constitutionally required
before the72 state can deprive an individual of [religious liberty]
interests." 1
Professor Gianelli has argued that "[a] thoroughgoing balancing
test would measure three elements of the competing government interest: first, the importance of the secular value underlying the government regulation; second, the degree of proximity and necessarily that
the chosen regulatory means bears to the underlying value; and third,
the impact that an exemption for religious reasons would have on the
overall regulatory program." 173 Yet even-this precise standard of review is without meaning, unless the courts require the state to present
"clear and convincing" proof as to the centrality and relative unobtrusiveness of the existing regulatory scheme.'7 4 Such a requirement
would be in accord with the current standard of review in equal protection and free speech lawsuits.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id at 506.
See Murreen supra note 17 at 8.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
Note, supra note 69, at 813.
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) ("the power to regulate [religious
conduct] must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the
protected freedoms.")
171. See Walz v. Tax Comi'n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan J., concurring) ("[religious
freedom] contribute to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a
vigorous, pluralistic society").
172. Boothby, supra note 14 at 618.
173. Gianelli, Religious Liberty, Establishment, and DoctrinalDevelopment- PartL The Religious
Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1390 (1967). A discussion of both the constitu-

tional standard applied in free exercise cases and the adequacy of that standard can be found
supra notes 170-172.
174. See supra note 104; and Clark, supra note 116.
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Inapplicability of Judicial Abstention Doctrine

Courts generally are reluctant to intervene in matters of education
policy on the basis of deference to the expertise of education decisionmakers and deference to the political process, which supposedly

serve as adequate independent checks on state and local education offi-

cials.' 7 5 Neither academic decisionmaking nor local control, however,
serve as adequate protection against abuses of religious liberty

guarantees.
The Supreme Court has recognized that "by and large, 'public edu-

cation in our nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities,' and the federal courts should not ordinarily 'intervene in the

resolution of conflict which arise in the daily operation of school systems.' "176 Recently, Chief Justice Burger again espoused the virtues of
local control
of public education in IslandTrees Union School District
17 7
. Pico.

This theory of local control, however, is inapplicable to Christian

day schools.
First, the logic of local control hinges on the assumption that individual choice will be fairly expressed through the political process. Yet
the raison d'etre for Christian day schools is a dissatisfaction on the
part of the fundamentalists with the current structure of public education. Hence, it would be absurd for a court to say that these minority
viewpoints must seek protection in the political process.
Second, the local control rationale ignores the transcendent constitutional rights at stake. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 78 for example, the

Court noted that it is the duty of federal courts "to apply the First
Amendment's mandate in our educational system where essential to
175. Note, DueProcess, Due Politics, and Due Respect: Three Models of Legitimate School Governance, 94 HARv. L. REv., 1106 (1981).
176. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
177. 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982). The Chief Justice stated in dissent in Pico:
Through participation in the election of school board members, the parents influence,
if not control, the direction of their children's education. A school board is not a giant
bureaucracy far removed from accountability for its actions; it is truly 'of the people
and by the people.' A school board reflects its constitutency in a very real sense and
thus could not long exercise unchecked discretion in its choice to acquire or remove
books. If the parents disagree with the educational decisions of the school board, they
can take steps to remove the board members from office.
Id at 2820-21 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In a similar vein, Justice Powell contended in Pico
that "[i]t is fair to say that no single agency of government at any level is closer to the people
whom it serves than the typical school board." Id at 2822 (Powell, J., dissenting).
This notion that the constitutional rights of students and their families are adequately
protected through the political process was adopted by a majority of the Court in Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). In Ingraham, the Court upheld the constitutionality of corporal punishment over due process and cruel and unusual punishment claims. For the
Court:
The openness of the public school and its supervision by the community afforded
significant safeguards against [abuse]. .. . As long as the schools are open to public
scrutiny, there is no reason to believe that the common-law constraints [of tort law]
will not effectively remedy and deter excesses.
Id at 670. See Note, supra note 175, at 1112-16.
178. 393 U.S. 624 (1968).
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safeguard the fundamental values of freedom of speech and of inquiry.' 179 The Court similarly held in West Virginia v. Barnette 0 the

Boards of Education have no functions "that they may not perform
within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual."'' If religious liberty is thus viewed
as being central to the constitutional scheme, judicial deference to state

education policies should not be based on the political process.
Courts, for the most part, also are unwilling to intervene in educa-

tion policy determinations. 18 2 The rationale behind
this standard of
83
review was stated in Tedeschi v. Wagner College:1
[M]atters involving academic standards generally rest upon the
subjective judgment of professional educators, (thus) courts are reluctant to impose the strictures of traditional legal rules. Though such
matters are subject to judicial scrutiny, the issue reviewed
in such a
184
case is whether the institution has acted in good faith.
The Supreme Court has also expressed support for the judgments of
professionals. 1 5 In Youngberg v. Romeo,' 86 Justice Powell accorded a

"presumptive correctness" to the decisions of professional personnel by

virtue of their "demonstrated" competence through education, training,
or experience. 187 In Board of Curators of University of Missouri v.
Horowitz'8 8 the Court went so far as to hold that the constitutional
procedural due process protections were afforded to a student dismissed on academic grounds simply because the dismissal was made by
professional educators. 8 9
Regardless of whether deference to academic expertise is sound judicial policy, 190 such deference is constitutionally impermissible if fundamental right exercises are at stake. As stated in Barnette,
179. Id at 104.
180. 319 U.S. 614 (1943).
181. Id at 637.
182. See Devins, Plagiarismat Princeton:An Academic Judgmentor a DisciplinaryProcedure,LEX
COLLEGII, Winter, 1983.
183. 49 N.Y.2d 652, 404 N.E.2d 1302 (1980).

184. Id at 658, 404 N.E.2d at 1304.
185. See Rosenblum, High Courts Supportfor Professionalismin Education, EDUC. WEEK, Oct. 6,
192, at 24.

186.
187.
188.
189.

102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).
Id at 2461-62.
435 U.S. 78 (1978).
See Note, supra note 175, at 1116-19. In Horowitz, the Court concluded that "the determination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the tools of indirect administrative
decisonmaking." 435 U.S. at 90.
190. Judge Bazelon observed that:
diffidence in the face of [academic] expertise is conduct unbecoming a court. Very
few judges are [educational experts]. But equally few are economists, aeronautic engineers, atomic scientists, or marine biologists. For some reason, however, many people
seem to accept judicial scrutiny of, say, the effect of a proposed dam on fish life, while
they reject similar scrutiny of [academic matters].
Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 742, 743-44 (1969). [as
adapted in Dessem, Academic Versus JudicialExpertise, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 476-481 (1978).
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The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicisitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and
9 to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the Courts.' '
Thus judicial deference to academic decisionmaking or local control is inappropriate when fundamental rights are at stake.192 Quite
simply, "First Amendment rights are entitled to special constitutional
solicitude."' 9 3 This "special constitutional solicitude" should be reflected through a requirement that the state produce "clear and convincing proof' that any state-imposed infringement on religious liberty
satisfy the least restrictive means-compelling interest requirement.
CONCLUSION
The conflict between Christian educators and the state is not likely
to end.19' Yet, the courts can assist in the resolution of this conflict by
adopting a standard of review that will lead to predictable results in
this type of case. The contention made in this article is that courts
should require the state to introduce "clear and convincing proof' that
its regulatory scheme is the least restrictive means available to effectuate some compelling state interest. 19' The importance of religious freedom in American life justifies the adoption of this standard. Finally,
judicial deference to either academic decisionmaking or the political
process are inadequate checks against state imposed interferences with
religious liberty freedoms. 9 6

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

319 U.S. at 639.
See supra notes 244 to 247 and accompanying text.
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
See supra notes 8-10 and Devins. supra note 4.
See supra notes 161-74 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 175-91 and accompanying text.

